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When similar patterns of expansion and contraction are observed across sectors, we call this a
business cycle. Yet explaining the similarity and synchronization of these cycles across industries
remains a puzzle. Whereas output growth across industries is highly correlated, identi¯able
shocks, like shocks to productivity, are far less correlated. While previous work has examined
complementarities in production, we propose that sectors make similar input decisions because
of complementarities in information acquisition. Because information about driving forces has
a high ¯xed cost of production and a low marginal cost of replication, it can be more e±cient
for ¯rms to share the cost of discovering common shocks than to invest in uncovering detailed
sectoral information. Firms basing their decisions on this common information make highly
correlated production choices. This mechanism ampli¯es the e®ects of common shocks, relative
to sectoral shocks.
¤We thank Susanto Basu and John Fernald for help with data. Thanks to Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Linyan Yang
and participants at the 2006 SED meetings for helpful comments. Keywords: business cycles, comovement puzzle,
information markets. JEL codes: E32, D82.Business cycles involve similar and synchronized movements in output across sectors. While
this comovement across industries in output is readily observed, its source is not. In canonical
business cycle models, similar output across industries is the result of aggregate shocks hitting
each industry. Yet the data reject this view: while output is highly correlated across industries,
total factor productivity is much less so (Rebelo 2005). While alternative aggregate shocks may
explain the comovement of output, Cochrane (1994) argues that they are elusive: \we haven't
found large, identi¯able, exogenous shocks to account for the bulk of output °uctuations" (p.296).1
This led him to characterize business cycles as driven by shocks to endogenous variables. Alterna-
tively, it could be that complementarities across industries synchronize output. Yet, the search for
quantitatively important production complementarities has not produced a consensus.2 Our paper
proposes a new source of complementarity, based on e±cient joint information acquisition about
sectoral productivity shocks.
Complementarity in information acquisition is a natural market outcome due to the special
characteristics of information. Because information has a high ¯xed cost of production and is non-
rival in consumption (and hence has a low marginal cost of replication), competitive information
producers must charge more for highly-tailored research (forecasting ¯rm- or sector-speci¯c shocks),
to cover their high average cost. By contrast, forecasts of macroeconomic aggregates, are relevant to
many producers. In equilibrium, aggregate forecasts will be purchased widely and produced at low
average cost. Information markets facilitate ¯rms sharing the expense of acquiring that information
that they will ¯nd jointly useful, while there are fewer opportunities for joint consumption of sector-
speci¯c information.
In our model, ¯rms don't necessarily want to produce more when others are producing more.
They simply want to acquire the same information others acquire; similar information leads to
1Similarly, a 1993 AEA session including Blanchard, Hall, Hansen and Prescott, examined oil prices, monetary
policy, ¯scal policy, regulation, international factors, and sectoral shifts. None could explain the 1990 U.S. recession
in particular, or more generally, the bulk of business cycle °uctuations.
2See Hornstein (2000). Various approaches have been tried, including input-output linkages (Long and Plosser
(1983), Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999), Horvath (2000)), consumption complemen-
tarities (Verbrugge 1997), inventory demands (Cooper and Haltiwanger 1990), strategic complementarity (Cooper
and Haltiwanger 1996), spillovers (Shea 2002), external economies of scale (Baxter and King 1991), and aggregate
demand spillovers (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989).
1similar decisions, and this drives comovement in both inputs and outputs. The low equilibrium price
of aggregate information induces some ¯rms to use aggregate data to make inferences about their
sector's productivity. When many ¯rms' inferences are based on common information, expected
productivity is more correlated than true productivity. Since production decisions depend only on
variables in producers' information sets, our model predicts that production decisions are highly
correlated across sectors, and hence output is more highly correlated than productivity is. While
sectoral productivity shocks are the model's driving force, the information market strips out much
of their sector-speci¯c e®ects. The information market passes on aggregate shocks to beliefs that
mimic the aggregate shocks to endogenous choice variables Cochrane (1994) observes in the data.
We begin by outlining the facts about comovement in Section 1. We show that output is
much more highly correlated across industries than productivity, and characterize the key empirical
puzzles. In Section 2, we illustrate our basic mechanism in the simplest possible setting: an
island model of production, appended with an information sector that supplies forecasts at an
endogenously determined price each period. In section 3 we calibrate and simulate the model. The
results highlight our main contribution|for most industries we generate comovement in output in
excess of comovement in driving forces, roughly in proportion to the facts outlined in Section 1.
A typical problem with models emphasizing information frictions is that the e®ect of the frictions
disappears when observable market prices can e±ciently aggregate information.3 Since the real
business cycles models we are building on are premised on e±cient markets, this is a serious
concern. Our e®ect does not disappear with a fully-revealing price. Comovement arises because
agents have similar information; it does not require information asymmetry. Markets that e±ciently
aggregate information can in fact strengthen the comovement of beliefs. To illustrate this e®ect,
Section 4 adds a market for labor that fully reveals all information through its market price and
equilibrium demand for labor. Even when information is a public good for all ¯rms, a few large
¯rms still discover it. Their signals become common, aggregate information, which are the basis
3For example, herding models collapse when there are a su±cient number of informative prices. This literature
includes papers such as Avery and Zemsky (1998), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992),
Caplin and Leahy (1994) and Welch (1992). The same can happen in models of global games, such as Morris and
Shin (2002).
2for projections by the remaining smaller ¯rms and sectors. Thus once again uncorrelated shocks
can yield strongly correlated beliefs about productivity.
However, this model does not generate comovement in output. The problem is shared by all
standard business cycle models: Highly-cyclical industries demand lots more labor in booms. This
demand drives up the wage. Less-cyclical industries, seeing mild cyclical increases in productiv-
ity but large wage increases, decide to hire fewer workers. Their output declines. This makes
all the industries with lower-than-average cyclicality have negative output correlations with aggre-
gate output. The average output correlation ends up near zero (Christiano and Fitzgerald 1999).
Macroeconomists have discovered many mechanisms that solve this cyclical wage problem, includ-
ing home production (Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright 1991), habit persistence (Boldrin, Christiano
and Fisher 2001), or capital adjustment costs (Jaimovich and Rebelo 2006). But these models are
based on aggregate productivity shocks. With sector-speci¯c shocks, they generate only as much
comovement in output as what there is in productivity (section 4.2).
Solving the excess comovement puzzle therefore requires two ingredients: a solution to the
aggregate shock problem and a solution to the cyclical wage problem. Our information friction
produces aggregate shocks. For less cyclical wages, section 4.3 uses home production, as in Benhabib
et al. (1991). The model delivers output comovement that exceeds productivity comovement. For
many industries, cross-industry output correlations in the model match or exceed those in the
data. Our approach still has one important shortcoming: It does not produce positive output
comovement for industries with counter-cyclical productivity. Section 4.4 shows how a change in
the information cost can amplify the e®ect of aggregate shocks to the wage and allow any industry
to exhibit positive output comovement.
The idea that common information is unduly in°uential also arises in models of global games.
In Morris and Shin (2002), a coordination motive in actions leads ¯rms to overweight and overvalue
common information, relative to what is socially e±cient. Our coordination motive in learning does
not require any coordination motive in production. Instead of being more valuable, our common
information is less costly. It is an e±cient way to economize on the ¯xed cost of information
3discovery.
Any theory of business cycle comovement should also be able to account for its long-run changes
and cross-sectional di®erences (section 5). As Comin and Philippon (2005) have documented, much
of the long-run decline in business cycle volatility can be traced to a decline in comovement across
industries. A decreasing cost of information can replicate this decline. With cheaper information,
sectors purchase more sector-speci¯c information, rely less on aggregates, and comove less with the
aggregate economy. In the cross-section, we examine data on industry output and asset prices. The
information contained in equity prices summarizes the information available about ¯rms' pro¯tabil-
ity. Abundant information corresponds with lower comovement and more e±cient input decisions,
both in the model and the data. The industry output data shows that industries with a higher
model-predicted demand for information comove less. These ¯ndings all support our main premise,
that industry comovement comes from incomplete information.
1 The Facts About Comovement
We begin by outlining the basic facts about sectoral comovement. Our data|which come from
Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006)|describe the evolution within the United States of sectoral
gross outputs and inputs of capital, labor, energy and materials within each of 29 private non-farm,
(roughly two-digit SIC) industries from 1949-1996.4 One of the advantages of the data provided
by Basu et al. (2006) is that they have constructed a \puri¯ed" measure of sectoral total factor
productivity (TFP)|a measure of the Solow residual, constructed to take account of non-constant
returns to scale in industry production functions, imperfect competition, and varying utilization of
labor and capital inputs.
Three facts paint a stark picture of the comovement puzzle. The average correlation of detrended
sectoral output with aggregate output is 0.51, while the average correlation of detrended sectoral
4These data are manipulations of current and past vintages of the Jorgenson KLEM data; see (Basu et al. 2006)
and appendix B for further details. We detrend these annual data using a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. We set the
smoothing parameter to 6, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Given the similarity of our approaches, it is
reassuring that our description of industry comovement is largely similar to that in Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999).
But there are di®erences in our data sources, industry categorizations, sample periods and detrending procedures,
although none that lead us to expect important di®erences.
4TFP with aggregate TFP is only 0.17. The high comovment in output comes from inputs: The
average correlation of detrended sectoral inputs with aggregate inputs is 0.57. (See appendix B for
sector-speci¯c correlations.) Why are input decisions highly correlated when productivity is not?
Shea (2002) provides a simple way to account for the importance of cross-industry correlations in
driving aggregate movements. He notes that the variance of aggregate output can be approximated
by wVw0, where w is a vector of industry shares, and V is the variance-covariance matrix of
sectoral output. He proposes decomposing aggregate output variance into a term due to the diagonal
elements of V, and a \comovement term" due to the o®-diagonal elements. Performing this exercise
on our data suggests that 83% of the variance in aggregate output is due to industry comovement
(and the corresponding proportion of variation in aggregate input use due to comovement is 85%).
Performing the same decomposition as above, the proportion of the variation in aggregate TFP
due to comovement is only 14%. It is the contrast of relatively strong comovement in output with


























































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Correlation of (detrended) TFP between Industries
Size of data point proportional to product of industry shares in value−added
Bivariate Industry Output Correlations Compared
With Bivariate Industry TFP Correlations
Figure 1: Bivariate Industry-by-Industry correlations in Output and Total Factor Productivity.
Excess comovement is represented by the cluster of correlations above the 45-degree line.
Figure 1 shows that this comovement puzzle is ubiquitous. For each pair of industries, we
compute the correlation of output, and the correlation of TFP. As the ¯gure shows, for all but
5a few small industry-pairs, the correlation of TFP is signi¯cantly larger than the correlation of
output. This ¯gure allows us to distinguish our interpretation of excess comovement from simple
measurement error in our measures of total factor productivity. Speci¯cally, excess comovement
would lead the data to be clustered above the 45-degree line, while while classical measurement
error would attenuate bivariate TFP correlations, leading the data to be clustered above the 45-
degree line for industries with positively correlated TFP, but clustering of data below the 45-degree
line for industries with negatively correlated TFP. Yet the data are (roughly) uniformly clustered








































































































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Correlation of Industry TFP with Aggregate TFP
Dashed line shows 45−degrees
Comovement of Output and Productivity
Figure 2: The Facts: Output Comovement v. TFP Comovement
Excess comovement is represented by the cluster of correlations above the 45-degree line.
Figure 2 shows the general pattern we are trying to match. In our simulations, we will construct
our productivity shocks to match industry correlations with the common shock, and assess our ¯t in
terms of how well the model matches the correlation of output with aggregate output. Two points
are particularly worth emphasizing. First, all but a handful of sectors lie above the 45-degree line,
suggesting generalized excess comovement. And second, both industries that receive a positive and
a negative loading on the common productivity shock appear to experience more positive (or less
6negative) loadings on the common output factor. We are not after a mechanism that ampli¯es
comovement. In the sections that follow, our goal is to develop a mechanism in which correlation
in output is systematically larger than that in productivity growth.
2 An Island Model of Information-Driven Comovement
In order to isolate the mechanism that is new to this paper, we begin with a model in which
information is the only source of interaction between industries. There are N industries, each of
which is an island populated by a representative agent. There are no trade or production linkages
between industries; workers on each island consume what they produce. Information matters
because island productivity is unknown at the start of each period. Moreover, before the island's
inhabitant makes her labor/leisure choice, she can purchase (imperfectly) informative forecasts of
either island-speci¯c, or aggregate productivity.
We use simple functional forms, which allow for tractable analytic expressions. Islanders have
exponential utility, with constant absolute risk aversion, ½, and preferences de¯ned over consump-
tion c and labor n:
Ui = ¡E[exp(¡½(ci ¡ Ãni))]: (1)
Production in each industry is linear in labor, with marginal product zi:
yi = zini: (2)





(E[zijIi] ¡ Ã) (3)
where Ii describes the information available on island i. Thus, labor e®ort is a function of be-
liefs about productivity, and is increasing in expected productivity, but decreasing in the level of
uncertainty.
7Each agent has a prior belief about productivity, which she may update in light of signals pur-
chased in the information market. More speci¯cally, each industry's productivity has an aggregate
component which is known, ¹z, an aggregate component which is unknown but learnable, ¹ z, an
industry-speci¯c component that is unknown but learnable, ´i, and an industry-speci¯c component
that unknown and unlearnable, ei:
zi = ¹z + ¯i¹ z + ´i + ei; (4)
where ¹z is common knowledge, ¹ z » N(0;¾2
z), ´i » N(0;¾2
n) and ei » N(0;Á2
j). All three random
variables are mutually independent and ´i and ei are i.i.d. across industries. Like the ¯ of a
¯nancial asset, an industry's ¯ measures the extent to which it covaries with the aggregate. Each
industry's ¯ is common knowledge.
Information Markets Three features of information are crucial. First, information is produced
according to a ¯xed-cost technology. A signal sj can be discovered at the beginning of the period
at a ¯xed cost Â. This can be interpreted as the cost of hiring an economist to make a productivity
estimate for an industry, a set of industries, or the economy as a whole. Information producers
can choose to either produce a signal about the aggregate economy, s0, or about a speci¯c sector
si. The information, once discovered, can be distributed at zero marginal cost. Second, reselling
purchased information is forbidden. In reality, intellectual property rights prohibit this. Third,
there is free entry into the provision of information. Any agent (on any island) can invest in the
production of information at any time.
For simplicity, we consider information suppliers competing on price in a perfectly contestable
market.5 As such, pro¯ts from information discovery depend on the price charged and demand for
information, given the pricing strategies of other agents. One way to ensure that the market is
contestable is to force information producers to choose prices in a ¯rst stage and choose entry in
a second stage. Let the number of the agents that demand signal sj, be ¸j. This depends on the
5This market structure is used because it produces a simple pricing formula. Veldkamp (2006) shows that Cournot
or monopolistically competitive markets also produce information prices that decrease in the quantity sold.
8price information producer j charges pj, and on all other posted prices for information. The pro¯t
from information production is price times demand, minus the ¯xed cost: ¼j = pj¸j ¡ Â.
If an information producer invests in learning about aggregate productivity, she learns a signal
s0 = ¹ z + e0; (5)
where the noise e0 » N(0;Á2
0). If she chooses to learn about industry i's productivity, she observes
an industry-speci¯c signal, si, that is the sum of the noisy signal of aggregate productivity, plus
the learnable industry-speci¯c shock:
si = ¯i(¹ z + e0) + ´i: (6)
This information structure ensures that any speci¯c sector will prefer to learn its sectoral forecast
than the aggregate forecast and in turn, will prefer to learn the aggregate forecast over another
industry's sectoral forecast. Moreover, conditional on an own-sectoral forecast, there is little useful
information in the aggregate forecast, and conditional on the aggregate forecast, there is no useful
information in another sector's forecast. Therefore, we examine sectors who choose to buy either
no signal, only the aggregate signal, or only their sector-speci¯c signal. (While we can relax the
signal structure and still generate our main results, they simplify the choice problem.)
Updating Beliefs Given the various forms of uncertainty shown in (4), a sector's prior beliefs




i), 8i. The information contained in a signal
depends on what kind of signal it is. Own-industry signals contain the most precise information
about industry-speci¯c productivity: si » N(zi¡¹z;¯2
i Á2
0+Á2
i). Aggregate signals contain strictly













To form posterior beliefs, agents combine their prior beliefs and signals, according to Bayes' law.
In this simple case, posteriors are simply a precision-weighted average of priors and signals. For
9the agents who do not observe any signal, their posterior beliefs are the same as their prior beliefs.
Those who observe their industry-speci¯c signal have posterior beliefs about their productivity that
are normally distributed with mean and variance:



















For ¯rms observing only the aggregate signal, their posterior beliefs are normally distributed with
mean and variance:6


















1. Information producers announce prices pj, at which they are willing to sell each signal sj.
After observing the prices posted by their competitors, they choose whether or not to incur
the ¯xed cost to produce each signal, taking as given the action of other agents.
2. Taking information prices and availability as given, agents choose what signals to purchase.
3. Agents choose consumption and labor. All decisions maximize (1), given all signals they have
discovered or purchased, and subject to their budget constraint. Agents in each industry
consume what they produce, plus the information market pro¯ts they earn, minus the cost
of any information they buy: ci = zini +
P
j(¼j ¡¿jLij), where Lij = 1 if agent i buys signal
j and 0 otherwise.
6Were ¯rms to observe other-industry signals, they would update in a similar fashion to those observing the
aggregate signal; for their purposes an other-industry signal is simply the aggregate signal plus noise. To adjust
posterior mean and variance in (9) and (10), replace the aggregate signal noise Á
2







j) and the aggregate signal realization s0 with the other-industry signal sj.
103 Main Results
3.1 Aggregate Information Generates Comovement
The only stochastic component of the model is the level of productivity, zi. While zi is not an input
into production decisions, E[zijIi] is the key driving force (equation 3). Thus, with no information
markets, the ¯rm's decisions would be the same every period. The addition of the information
market ensures that E[zijIi] is shaped by the information purchased, and this is the source of
the model's excess comovement. For two ¯rms that both observe their industry-speci¯c signal,
the correlation of their conditional expectations is dictated by the correlation of their observable
fundamentals. In contrast, when two ¯rms observe the aggregate signal, their common source of
information gives them more highly correlated conditional beliefs.
Proposition 1 If ¯i¯j > 0, the correlation of labor input for any two industries is higher if those






j). This inequality is strict if ¾2
´ > 0.
Proof : in appendix A.1. The only force causing labor input to vary over time is the realization
of the common signal. Since the only driving force is a common one, the labor input of two of these
aggregate-informed industries is perfectly correlated. An industry that observes only aggregate
information has labor supply that depends only on the aggregate signal s0, we can write:
nA
i = ®i(s0 + °i) (11)
where °i = (¹z ¡ Ã)(Á2
0 + ¾2
z)=(¯i¾2
z), ®i = ¯i=(½V ar[zijs0]) ¤ ¾2
z=(Á2
0 + ¾2
z), and V ar[zijs0] is given
in equation (10).
The resulting covariances of output are derived in appendix A.2. Because output is a product
of two normal variables, labor and productivity, its second moments are far less tractable. While
output covariances with aggregate and ¯rm-speci¯c information cannot be compared analytically,
we will compare comovement numerically when we simulate the model in section 3.3.
113.2 Equilibrium Information Provision
In equilibrium, the price of a piece of information is the ¯xed cost of discovering it, divided by the
number of agents who demand the signal: pj = Â=¸j. Free entry at the stage where information
prices are set ensures zero pro¯t for information suppliers. If they made pro¯ts, other suppliers
would enter the market. That would not be an equilibrium. Zero pro¯t means that the price
of information times the quantity demanded equals the cost of discovery: cj¸j = Â. Thus, each
information supplier prices at average cost.
Proposition 2 A ¯rm will purchase the aggregate signal s0 if two conditions are satis¯ed:
1. Buying the aggregate signal at price Â=¸ yields higher utility than buying the industry signal,
































See appendix A.3 for proof.
Because of the assumption of a nested information structure, an agent who buys information is
always deciding between only two signals: either the own-industry-speci¯c signal or the aggregate
signal. No agent will ever purchase multiple signals. The industry-speci¯c signal contains all the
information contained in other signals, to the extent that they relevant for this industry. Likewise,
other-industry signals are only noisy approximations to the information in the aggregate signal. So,
no agent who could observe the aggregate signal would learn any additional relevant information
from an other-industry signal. The only time agents might purchase multiple signals is if other
industry-signals were cheaper than the aggregate signal. If this were the case, one of the signal
providers could switch to providing the aggregate signal, for the same price, and make a pro¯t.
12As the economy becomes large (N ! 1) and information becomes expensive (Â ! 1),
industry-speci¯c information becomes more and more costly and its demand falls to zero. All
agents purchase either aggregate information (at a price Â=¸ which is stationary for a given frac-
tion of islands purchasing information ¸=N), or no information. With high variance of productivity
zi, information will be valuable and not learning will be a costly choice. This is the type of envi-
ronment where many agents choose to observe aggregate information and the strongest aggregate
shocks emerge.
3.3 Simulating the model
Choosing parameter values To match the model and data, we give each of our islands the
characteristics of one of the 2-digit industries described in section 1. Speci¯cally, we construct the
aggregate TFP process to match the variance of aggregate TFP in the data (¾z=0.4 log points).7
The industry TFP processes are constructed to match the variance of each industry's TFP in the
data, and also to ensure that the covariance of each industry's TFP with aggregate TFP matches
the data. This involved estimating a one-factor model, TFPit = ®i + ¯i ~ TFPagg;t, and equating
two features of the model and data: the loading on the aggregate factor ¯i and the sum of the
¯rm-speci¯c shock variances (¾´ +Áii). The relevant parameters for each industry are described in
appendix B. Thus, basic patterns in the data drive the pattern of shocks in our simulations.
One feature of the model that the data cannot inform us about is how much of each shock is
learnable by information producers. For the aggregate shock, we assume the the variance of the
noise is equal to the variance of the true shock (Á2
0 = ¾2
z). The equivalent assumption for the
industry speci¯c shock is that the observable shock and the unobservable shock have equal variance
(¾2
´ = Á2
ii). In both cases, the signal-to-noise ratio is one.
We set other parameters at standard values: absolute risk aversion (½ = 4); a disutility of labor
(Ã = 0:96) which matches the relative volatility of labor hours in the data std(n)=std(y) = 0:8
(Benhabib et al. 1991); and a cost of information (Â = 0:2) chosen to induce some industries to
7Aggregate TFP is constructed as the weighted average of industry TFP, where weights re°ect each industry's
share in total value-added
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Model Fit: RMSE=.61
Comovement of Output and Total Factor Productivity
Figure 3: Output Comovement v. TFP Comovement in the Island Model
Excess comovement is represented by the cluster of correlations above the 45-degree line.
Results Figure 3 illustrates the comovement in each simulated sector. The important feature of
this graph is that the industries that observe the aggregate signal have signi¯cantly higher output
correlations, in excess of their TFP correlations. The average correlation of an industry with
aggregate output is 47%, compared to 51% in the data. For productivity, this average correlation
is 17%, equal to the data by construction. Of the 47% output correlation, 7% is really excess
correlation { the model's average correlation is 0.07 larger than it would be if all industries observed
their industry-speci¯c signal.8 The industries that observe aggregate information exhibit stronger
excess comovement, with correlations 0.09-0.12 higher in absolute value than they would be with
full information. All other industries have excess correlation that is less than 1%.
One obvious failing of this model is its prediction that all industries with counter-cyclical TFP
¯i < 0 have counter-cyclical output. In the data, more than half of these industries have pro-cyclical
TFP. What this model does is make a heterogeneous shock setting look like one with one aggregate
8Another natural benchmark would be to give all industries perfect foresight about their true productivity. The
problem with that benchmark, in this setting, is that it would lead all industries to choose an in¯nite amount of
labor. If we switch to CES preferences or include a labor market, we could use perfect-foresight as a benchmark.
14shock. In that sense, it achieves its goal. But a one-shock model would also predict that the output
of such industries is counter-cyclical. One way to remedy this problem is to introduce a second
aggregate shock, for example, oil prices. Since this is a shock relevant to all sectors, many will
choose to learn about it and oil information should also be inexpensive. If negative ¯ industries
are more sensitive to oil price than to aggregate TFP (which is possible because many of these
industries have small TFP-loadings), then the e®ect of oil shocks might dominate the e®ect of TFP
for these ¯rms. Even ¯rms with counter-cyclical TFP can potentially have pro-cyclical output. An
example of this comes in section 4.4.
One of the reasons that it is important to understand comovement is because it helps to explain
the volatility of business cycles. Fluctuations in output are more volatile than what measured
changes in productivity can account for. If sectors' output covaries highly, then the sum, aggregate
output, will have higher volatility. Our model produces additional volatility. In fact, it produces
too much of it, a 9.5% standard deviation of log output. There are at least two simple reasons
model output is too volatile. First, there are no decreasing returns. The linearity of the production
function simpli¯es the analysis, but makes labor °uctuate excessively. Second, there is no capital.
Capital, unlike labor, is a slow-moving stock that must be built up over time. Its presence would
dampen output °uctuations.
Although the model's output variance does not match the data, its fraction of variance that
comes from sectoral covariance does. Using the Shea (2002) decomposition, section 5 argued that
83% of variance in aggregate output is due to sectoral comovement. Applying the same decom-
position to the simulated model reveals that 77% of the model's variance comes from its sectoral
comovement.
This model illustrates how information markets dampen the e®ect of heterogeneous information
and transmit more aggregate information. In this instance, the aggregate information is aggregate
productivity. But the mechanism is more general than that. It ¯lters out all kinds of industry-
speci¯c and ¯rm speci¯c information and delivers aggregate shocks to beliefs. These shocks to
beliefs show up in the data as shocks to endogenous choice variables, just as they do in the data.
154 Adding a Market For Labor
The island model of section 2 illustrates why the non-rival nature of information produces com-
plementarity in information acquisition, and why this can induce comovement in industry output.
However, that model is missing many realistic features of the aggregate economy such as labor
markets or tradeable goods. This might be a cause for concern: Market prices that aggregate
information have been the achilles' heel of other information friction models. It also leaves unan-
swered questions about how inter-island linkages can a®ect information transmission and output
comovement. In this section, we show that the information mechanism that ¯lters out heteroge-
neous information and transmits aggregate shocks to choice variables still functions, albeit with
some modi¯cations, in the presence of a perfectly e±cient market price.
We now change the island model by allowing island workers to supply labor to other islands,
at a market wage. That wage reveals all information. In standard business cycle models, such a
factor market typically serves only to deepen the comovement puzzle: Positive shocks to one sector
may lead employers to bid labor away from other sectors, decreasing output elsewhere. While the
cyclical wage problem does arise here, applying a well-known solution to that problem allows our
information e®ect to continue operating, even strgoner than before.
The public good nature of information rules out the possibility information-cost sharing through
an information market: No one will share the cost of a signal they will otherwise observe for free.
However, a few large industries underwrite public provision of some information. For smaller
or less volatile industries, it is more economical to infer their productivity from this free other-
industry information, than to discover their industry-speci¯c signal. Beliefs based on common,
public information comove, more than TFP alone would predict. Thus, the model's mechanism is
robust to both a labor market and the unravelling of all private information.
Setup Each agent i is endowed with a technology zi and 1 unit of time, which she supplies to a
labor market, or consumes as leisure li < 1. Agents have exponential preference for consumption c.
U = ¡E[~ »(1 ¡ li)2 exp(¡½c)]: (12)
16The form of utility over leisure needs to change from the previous model because the payo® to
supplying labor is no longer random. Whereas before, the e®ective wage was the marginal product
zi, which was unknown, now the wage w is known when li;ni are chosen. Using the previous utility
formulation would yield an indeterminate labor supply with a non-random payo®. This form of
utility ensures the labor supply is a linear function of the wage and keeps the model tractable.
Production requires combining labor n, which can be hired at an endogenous wage w, and
technology to get output of sector i: yi = zini.
Agents can also decide whether to discover information about their sector ¸i = 1, or not ¸i = 0.
Discovering information about your sector means that the signal si = ¯i¹ z + ´i becomes common
knowledge. As explained before, because information is a public good, sectors cannot commit
to share the cost of discovering information about ¹ z. Without cost-sharing, no industry would
ever prefer to acquire the aggregate or an other-industry signal, because those do not contain any
information that is not already in the own-industry signal.
The agent's budget constraint is that she can eat what she produces, minus the cost of the
labor, net of labor supplied, and the cost of information discovery:
ci = zini ¡ wni + w(1 ¡ li) ¡ Â¸i: (13)
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of labor fni ¸ 0g, leisure flig 2 [0;1], consumption fci ¸ 0g,
and information choices f¸ig 2 f0;1g that maximize (12) subject to (13), and a market wage w





4.1 Results with Costly Information but No Home Production









17The ¯rst-order condition for leisure dictates the labor supply.
1 ¡ li =
½
2~ »
w ´ »w (15)






i=1 1=V ar[zijIi] + ½»
+ ³: (16)
where ³ = 0 if the non-negativity constraints on ni do not bind. Since all information is public,
this wage is known to all agents.
An agent that discovers their industry signal believes that their productivity is zi » N(¹z +
siÁ¡2
i vi;vi), where vi = 1=(Á¡2
i + (¾2
z + ¾2
´)¡1)). For an agent who infers their sector productivity
from others's signals, the precision of their information depends on how many of those signals were
observed. Suppose that S signals are in the public domain: fs1;:::;sSg. Each one is an independent
signal about ¹ z with variance ¾2
´=¯2




i si)V ar[¹ zjs1;:::;sS]





z )¡1. Since agents who did not discover their industry
signal have no information about the industry-speci¯c component of their productivity, their ex-
pected value of their own zi and ¹ z are the same. But their beliefs about their own industry have
higher variance: V ar[zijs1;:::;sS] = V ar[¹ zjs1;:::;sS] + ¾2
´ + Á2
i.
Since all agents that do not discover information have identical beliefs about their productivity,
they have perfectly correlated labor decisions, just like in section 2. The only di®erence here is
that whether labor decisions are perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated depends on
whether the industry's TFP is more or less procyclical than the wage.
Proposition 3 Correlation of labor inputs. Suppose that the non-negativity constraint on labor
does not bind (» = 0). If only one industry l chooses to observe its industry-speci¯c productivity,
then corr(ni;nj) = 1 or ¡1, for all ¯rms i and j.
If more than one industry chooses to observe its industry-speci¯c productivity, but industry i
and industry j both choose not to, then corr(ni;nj) = 1 i® ¯i = ¯j.
18Proof in appendix A.4. When there is only one ¯rm learning in the economy, there is only one
shock that determines all ¯rms' beliefs and the wage. Since E[zijFi] ¡ w is proportional to the
same random variable, for every ¯rm, all ¯rms have perfectly correlated labor inputs. When more
than one ¯rm learns, the wage and the posterior beliefs depend on the realized signals in slightly
di®erent ways. Therefore, each ¯rm's labor inputs are a di®erent linear combination of these two
shocks. That linear combination is the same only when both ¯rms are uninformed and have the
same loading on aggregate productivity.
Information Choice and the Free-Rider E®ect When labor prices and quantities fully reveal
the information others observe, information becomes a public good. This introduces a free-rider
problem that was not present in the baseline model. But this 'problem' actually strengthens our
result. Free-riding makes ¯rms not want to learn, when one or more other ¯rms are learning. It is
these ¯rms that decide not to learn that base their actions on aggregate information and exhibit the
excess comovement. Thus, the more industries free-ride o® the information of others, the stronger
comovement becomes.
Simulation With one exception, the parameter values are identical to those in section 3.3. The
information cost needs to be lower for some industries to acquire information because the bene¯ts
to public information are lower than the bene¯ts to the private information in section 2. We set
the new information cost to Â = 0:01.
In ¯gure 4, output comovement is near zero (-4%), on average. The problem is that highly-
cyclical (high-¯) industries demand lots more labor in booms. This demand drives up the wage.
Less-cyclical (low-¯) industries, seeing mild cyclical increases in productivity but large wage in-
creases, decide to hire fewer workers. Their output declines. This makes all the industries whose
expected productivity is less cyclical than the wage have negative output correlations with aggre-
gate output. Even mild positive correlation from productivity is swamped by the substitutability
in production that arises from the cyclical wage e®ect. This problem is common to all standard

























































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Correlation of Industry Total Factor Productivity
with Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
Common information
revealed through the labor market
Specialized industry information
Industry consumes:
Dashed line is 45−degree line
Model Fit: RMSE=.86
Comovement of Output and Total Factor Productivity
Figure 4: Simulated model: Incorporating a labor market, costly information but no home produc-
tion.
4.2 Results with Home Production and Costless Information
To solve the cyclical wage problem, we use the ¯x developed by Benhabib et al. (1991): a large, not
highly cyclical, home production sector. Because this sector has productivity shocks that are not
very correlated with the aggregate productivity, it makes the wage less cyclical. It absorbs lots of
labor when aggregate productivity is low, keeping the wage up, and sheds workers when aggregate
productivity is high, keeping the wage from rising.
In this subsection, we add this one additional industry, to have 30 in total. We also turn o®
the information friction by making information costless (Â = 0). This highlights what the e®ect
the home production sector alone has. In the next subsection, we will examine the full model with
home production and information frictions.
Simulation The introduction of one new sector leaves 2 new parameters to be chosen. The
loading of the home production industry on aggregate productivity (¯h) is 0:05 and the variance
of the home production shock is 0.34%. This ¯h allows the standard deviation of aggregate market
labor, relative to the data to match the data (0.8, as reported in Benhabib et al. (1991)). The
20industry-speci¯c variance Á2
h is chosen to equate the time spent on home production and on market

























































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Correlation of Industry Total Factor Productivity
with Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
Common information
revealed through the labor market
Specialized industry information
Industry consumes:
Dashed line is 45−degree line
Model Fit: RMSE=.53
Comovement of Output and Total Factor Productivity
Figure 5: Simulated model: Incorporating a labor market and home production, but no information
frictions.
Figure 5 shows that the average correlation of each industry's output with the aggregate (37%)
is lower than the 51% correlation in the data. Even more striking is that less than half (47%)
of the variation in output comes from comovement, compared to 83% in the data. Adding home
production is clearly an improvement because without it, average comovement is close to zero. But,
home production alone cannot explain the large output correlations in the data.
4.3 Results with Home Production and Costly Information
Results of the previous two subsections have demonstrated that replicating the high output co-
movement in the data will require both solving the cyclical wage problem and generating some
aggregate shocks. This model puts the two pieces together and achieves high output comovement.
The setting is exactly the same as before, but with a positive information cost (Â = 0:01).
For many industries, output correlation in the model matches or exceeds that in the data

























































−1 −.5 0 .5 1
Correlation of Industry Total Factor Productivity
with Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
Common information
revealed through the labor market
Specialized industry information
Industry consumes:
Dashed line is 45−degree line
Model Fit: RMSE=.39
Comovement of Output and Total Factor Productivity
Figure 6: Simulated model: Incorporating a labor market, a home production sector, and costly
information.
Excess comovement is represented by the cluster of correlations above the 45-degree line.
full-informative prices, as it is in the island model. The average sector's correlation with aggregate
output is 44%, slightly less than the 51% in the data. Likewise, the Shea decomposition tells us
that fraction of aggregate output variance from comovement is 69%, compared to 83% in the data.
Yet there is one remaining problem: sectors with counter-cyclical productivity also have counter-
cyclical output. In the data, most of these sectors have pro-cyclical output. Next, we examine a
second aggregate shock that can solve this problem
4.4 A Second Aggregate Shock
A simplifying assumption of this model is that there was one common factor ¹ z that all sector's pro-
ductivities were related to. The one-factor model cannot explain why TFP and output correlations
sometimes have di®erent signs. It can only magnify or dampen the correlation in fundamentals.
Another possibility is that there are multiple common factors. If two sectors both load positively
on a factor they learn about, this introduces positive correlation in their beliefs and in their input
decisions. Even if another factor makes the sectors' fundamental productivity negatively corre-
22lated, if they do not learn much about that factor, it does not undo the positive correlation in their
actions. With multiple factors, sign reversals are possible: labor inputs can comove positively, even
if productivity has a negative correlation.
Simulation The only di®erence between this simulation and the previous one is that the info
cost is now higher (Â = 0:05). Because information is more expensive, only 1 market industry
learns. The non-learning ¯rms can use only this one signal to make inference about aggregate TFP.
Therefore, their inferences about aggregate TFP are very noisy. Non-learning sectors don't react
strongly to noisy info. However, the home-production sector's productivity is also observed. While
this shock is speci¯c to the home sector's productivity, the home sector is so large, that a change in
its productivity a®ects the wage. This is a form of aggregate shock that all market industries load
on with the same sign: When wages are higher, every industry produces less than they otherwise
would. Because ¯rms are reacting less to aggregate TFP, the e®ect of the wage shock becomes
more dominant when information cost is high. Because all sectors react the same way to wages
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Correlation of Industry Total Factor Productivity
with Aggregate Total Factor Productivity
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revealed through the labor market
Specialized industry information
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Comovement of Output and Total Factor Productivity
Figure 7: Correlation of industry and aggregate productivity and output, with a labor market,
a home production sector, and a higher information cost. Excess comovement is represented by the
cluster of correlations above the 45-degree line.
23When ¯rms can choose whether on not to purchase information in the high-information-cost
model, only one market ¯rm acquires their industry-speci¯c signal. The resulting pattern of co-
movement is illustrated in ¯gure 7. Information choice causes the average correlation of output
with the market to be 61%, 10% higher than in the data. The fraction of aggregate output variance
explained by comovement is 87% in this model, surpassing the 83% in the data. Pairwise corre-
lations also reveal strong excess comovement: The average pairwise correlation of all industries
output is 60%, while the average pairwise correlation of TFP is 8%.
This exercise is not meant to persuade the reader that home production shocks are an important
driver of business cycles. In reality, the other important aggregate shocks are the usual suspects:
in°ation risk, oil prices, shocks to foreign markets. The point this exercise makes is that information
markets can transmit the aggregate information in these kinds of shocks as well. This can make
negative-¯ industries exhibit positive comovement.
5 Empirical Support for the Theory
The challenge in testing a theory based on informational scarcity is that the signals agents chose
to acquire are not directly observable or measurable. Instead, we must rely on indirect measures
of information quantity. One such measure is the information content of a ¯rm's equity price.
Another approach is to let the model predict which ¯rms should learn more. Evidence from both
approaches supports the theory.
5.1 Information Comovement: Evidence from Financial Markets
The e±cient markets hypothesis says that equity prices summarize available information regarding
a ¯rm's pro¯tability. Thus equity prices inform us about what information ¯rms might have. If
prices predicted future earnings precisely, we could infer that ¯rms are well-informed. This idea
that equity prices inform ¯rms' input choices is supported by Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006).
Our model predicts that equity prices should re°ect more cheap, aggregate information than
expensive industry- or ¯rm-speci¯c information. Empirical ¯nance studies con¯rms this prediction:
24equity prices of di®erent ¯rms and sectors comove more than corporate earnings. That is, prices
are driven more by aggregate than ¯rm-speci¯c information.
Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) argue that this over-weighting of aggregate infor-
mation comes from an information friction. Consistent with this interpretation, they note that
prices which are most strongly driven by the aggregate or common component are also the worst
predictors of future earnings. At the industry level, greater industry-speci¯c price variation (and
hence less reliance on aggregate signals) is also correlated with the existence of a larger number
information-producing analysts (Piotroski and Roulstone 2003). These facts support our prediction
that when information is scarce, it has more aggregate content. When information is abundant,
¯rms have access to signals with relatively more ¯rm-speci¯c content.
There is a further parallel between the uninformed ¯rms in our model, and those empirical ¯rms
whose equity prices show little ¯rm-speci¯c variation: both also make less e±cient input choices.
Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) ¯nd that ¯rms with more ¯rm-speci¯c equity price variation make
more e±cient real investments. In our model, ¯rms whose signals contain more industry-speci¯c
information make more e±cient labor input decisions.9
For instance, when no industries are informed, the average correlation between productivity zi
and labor input ni in our model is zero. When all ¯rms are informed, that correlation is 74%. If half
the ¯rms are informed, then the average correlation for informed ¯rms is 71% and for uninformed
¯rms is 2%.
5.2 Output Comovement: Evidence from Manufacturing Data
According to proposition 3.2, sectors with more sector-speci¯c productivity variation (high V ar(zijs0))
value sector-speci¯c information more. If such sectors acquire more sector-speci¯c information, then
their excess comovement will be low. This is not saying that more idiosyncratic variation in in-
9To verify that a similar result obtains in our model { for output, rather than equity prices { we compute Durnev et
al. (2004)'s comovement statistic for informed and uninformed ¯rms' output, in the simulated model. Their measure
is based on R
2, calculating the contribution of industry j to comovement as the di®erence in the fraction of industry
output variation explained by aggregate output and the fraction explained by the aggregate less industry j. In the
simulated labor model (section 4.3), only industries with that obtain sector-speci¯c information have positive R
2
measures. The output of industries with only aggregate signals contains no information beyond that contained in the
output of informed ¯rms (R
2 = 0).
25dustry TFP implies lower correlation between sectoral and aggregate TFP: that is a mechanical
relationship. Rather, the model predicts that such sectors should have lower output correlation,
after accounting for the lower correlation of productivity.
This prediction is borne out in U.S. data on output and TFP across the 459 4-digit manufac-
turing sectors covered in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.10 We approximate
V ar(zijs0) by taking the industry-speci¯c residuals from an estimated one-factor TFP model. An-
alyzing detrended annual data from from 1958-1996, we then estimated:
corr(outputind;outputagg) ¡ corr(TFPind;TFPagg) = 0:048 ¡ 5:46 ¢ V ar(TFPindjTFPagg)): (17)
(0:006) (2:89)
We ¯nd that high levels of idiosyncratic TFP variation|which in the model would be associated
with greater demand for industry-speci¯c information|is associated with a smaller gap between
the correlation between industry and aggregate output, and the correlation between industry and
aggregate TFP. To get a sense of the relevant magnitudes for instance, note that the di®erence
between a ¯rm at the 25th percentile of idiosyncratic TFP variance (0.04%) and a ¯rm at the 75th
percentile (0.15%) is about a 12% decline in excess comovement. This e®ect is also statistically
signi¯cant at the 90% con¯dence level. Finally, a simulation exercise shows that if there is measure-
ment error in TFP, our estimates understate the true relationship between idiosyncratic variance
and excess comovement.
5.3 The Long-Run Fall in Comovement
Over the last 30 years, ¯rm-level volatility increased and aggregate volatility decreased. Comin
and Philippon (2005) show these two facts imply a decrease in ¯rm comovement. Our model could
explain this trend from a decreasing cost of information over time. According to the model, a
10These data come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, by Eric J. Bartelsman, Randy A.
Becker, and Wayne B. Gray, June 2000 (http://www.nber.org/nberces/nbprod96.htm). We analyze these detailed
sectoral data rather than the 2-digit data emphasized earlier in the paper, because the 29 industries o®ered too few
data points to estimate any e®ect precisely.
26falling information cost causes more ¯rms to acquire ¯rm or industry-speci¯c signals. This moves
the economy closer to the full-information economy, which exhibits no excess comovement.
Using the calibrated model, we illustrate how small changes in the cost of information can
replicate the comovement decline observed in the data. Figure 8 illustrates this e®ect.





























































































































of industry and aggregate output for the simulated labor market model with home production. Parameters
are the same as in previous island and labor market simulations. The total amount paid for all information
varies between 0.05% and 0.13% of aggregate GDP.
When information costs are very low, this is the full-information model of section 4.2. Because
each sector gets its sector-speci¯c information, there are no aggregate shocks introduced by infor-
mation. As the information cost rises, ¯rms economize on information costs by purchasing cheaper,
aggregate information. Aggregate information introduces aggregate shocks, the source of comove-
ment. When information becomes very expensive, little information is acquired. Less information
has less e®ect on agents' beliefs. As the aggregate shock to beliefs diminishes, comovement declines.
In the extreme, if neither the market nor the home sector were to acquire any information, there
would be no movement in beliefs, output correlation would be determined only by TFP correlation,
and there would be zero excess comovement.
If the economy started somewhere to the left of the peak in comovement, then arbitrarily small
decreases in information cost have the potential to dramatically decrease output comovement. The
opposite prediction, that a decline in information costs would increase comovement, would require
that information is currently so scarce as to paralyze decision-making. While this is theoretically
possible, it is not realistic. A model with such limited information would never produce su±ciently
27volatile investment. Furthermore, free data about the aggregate economy, in practice, is not scarce.
Finally, the asset price facts (section 5.1) tell us that low-information signals lack ¯rm-speci¯c
information, but do contain aggregate information. Therefore, we conjecture that the economy is
to the left of the peak in ¯gure 8 and that decreases in information costs would cause comovement
to fall.
6 Conclusion
Industry comovement in business cycles may arise from ¯rms' desires to economize on information
costs. Learning aggregate, rather than ¯rm-speci¯c information allows ¯rms to share the costs of
aggregate information with other ¯rms, or to free-ride o® information other ¯rms acquire. Both of
these possibilities arise because of the non-rival nature of information. Because information used
by one ¯rm can also be used by another ¯rm, whereas capital or labor cannot be shared in such a
way, information is a natural candidate for a source of hidden complementarities.
The information that producers purchase does not have to be productivity information. Any-
thing that has a ¯rm-speci¯c and an aggregate component to it and is relevant to production
decisions could cause comovement. Alternatives include demand, wage, or price information. Also,
the theory could explain ¯rm comovement within industries. We chose to focus on industry co-
movement because in noisy ¯rm-level data, it is less clear that a comovement puzzle exists.
Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988) taught us that information production was critical to sustain
long run growth. Because information is non-rival, accumulating information can achieve what
accumulating physical goods cannot. Despite the fact that real business cycle models were designed
to explain short-run and long-run growth with the same tools, most have neglected information.
Given that production of non-rival information was the key to understanding long run growth, why
wouldn't it play a key role in business cycles as well?
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30A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Using equation (4), the covariance of productivity is ¯i¯j¾2
z. For a given information choice,
V ar[zijFi] is not random. The only random variable in (3) is E[zijFi]. Since correlations are
invariant to linear transformations, corr(ni;nj) = corr(E[zijFi];E[zjjFi]).
For ¯rms with aggregate information, the conditional expectation is given by equation (9); the
only random variable is s0, the common signal both agents observe. The aggregate signal s0 enters
in both conditional expectations linearly. Thus, corr(E[zijs0];E[zjjs0]) = corr(s0;s0) = 1, and
therefore corr(na
i;na
j) = 1. Since the correlation of the informed ¯rms labor input cannot exceed
one, the correlation of aggregate-information labor input must be weakly greater.
To establish strict inequality, we must compute the correlation of informed ¯rms' labor, using
(3) and (7): corr(nFI
i ;nFI







´)]¡1=2. Note that the denominator
is strictly larger than the numerator, and thus the correlation is strictly less than one whenever
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A.2 Output Covariance in the Island Model
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With Aggregate Signal For ¯rms that observe the aggregate signal, their labor input is given
by (11). Combining with the expression for zi from (4) and substituting in the de¯nition of s0:
zini = ®i(¯i¹ z + ´i + ei)(¹ z + e0 + °i) (20)
After removing additive constant terms, the covariance is
cov(yi;yj) = ®i®j¯i¯jfE[(~ z + ¹z)2)(~ z + e0 + °i)(~ z + e0 + °j)] ¡ E[~ z2 + ¹z°i]E[~ z2 + ¹z°j]g (21)
where ~ z is the mean-zero variable ¹ z ¡ ¹z. Taking expectations, using the fact that E[~ z4] = 3¾2
z,
E[~ z3] = 0, E[e0] = Á2
0 and rearranging delivers the expression in the corollary.
31With Full Information The full-information optimal labor supply is ni = (¯i¹ z +´i ¡Ã)=(½Á2
i).
Combining this with the expression for zi in (4) yields zini = (¯i¹ z + ´i + ei)(¯i¹ z + ´i ¡ Ã)=(½Á2
i).
Expected output is E[zini] = (¯2
i (¾2
z + ¹2
z) ¡ Ã¯i¹z + ¾2
´)=(½Á2
i).
To compute output covariance, we ¯rst take E[yiyj]¡E[yi]E[yj] and cancel out the cross-terms
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Simplifying this expression and using the formulas for the higher moments detailed above, we get
the expression in the corollary.
A.3 Proof of proposition 3.2 (Derivation of information value)









jE[zijIi]]] ¢ K (23)
where K = exp(½
P
j(¡¼j+Lijpj)) is the utility bene¯t from information sales or cost of purchases.
That part of utility is deterministic. Inside the inner expectation, the only random variable is zi,
which is normally distributed about E[zijIi] with variance V ar[zijIi]. Applying the formula for the









] ¢ K: (24)
The one random variable left in the expectation is E[zijIi]. Because beliefs are a martingale, its
expectation must be equal to the prior mean ¹i. The variance of beliefs after observing the signal is
¾2
i ¡V ar[zijIi]. Using the moment-generating formula for a non-central chi-square, the expectation















The exponential term contains only parameters and prior beliefs. Information only a®ects utility
multiplicatively. The lower the standard deviation of posterior beliefs, the less negative utility is.
To derive the willingness to pay for information, substitute back in the constant K. For an






















For the agent that does not purchase a signal, the posterior and prior variances are equal:






















exp(½pj) > ¡1: (28)
Rearranging and taking logs on both sides yields the condition in the text. 2
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
Part I: If only one industry l chooses to observe its industry-speci¯c productivity, but industry i
and industry j both choose not to, then corr(ni;nj) = 1 or ¡1.
If l learns, then (zl + ´l) is the public signal about aggregate productivity. Posterior beliefs
are ^ ¹ z = (zl + ´l)Á¡2
l =(Á¡2
l + ¾¡2
z ). Note that this posterior is comprised of known constants and
(zl + ´l), and is linear in (zl + ´l).




¯i^ ¹ z=Vi + (zl + ´l)=Vl] + ¹z
where K1 is a known constant, as are the posterior variances Vi and Vl. Since ^ ¹ z is linear in (zl+´l),




¯i=Vi + K2=Vl]^ ¹ z + ¹z:
Substituting the posterior and the wage into equation (3) tells us that labor inputs in an
uninformed sector i are
ni = 1=(½Vi)((¯i ¡ 1=K1(
X
i6=l
¯i=Vi + K2=Vl))^ ¹ z + ¹z)
as long as the non-negativity constraints on ni don't bind. The labor input of sector j is de¯ned
analogously. Since both are linear functions of one random variable ^ ¹ z, their correlation is 1 if
(¯i ¡ 1=K1(
P
i6=l ¯i=Vi + K2=Vl) and (¯j ¡ 1=K1(
P
i6=l ¯i=Vi + K2=Vl) have the same sign and ¡1
otherwise.
There is a knife-edge case where (¯i¡1=K1(
P
i6=l ¯i=Vi+K2=Vl) = 0 for either industry, in which
case the correlation will be zero. Since with any random draw of parameters, this is a measure-zero
event, the proposition focuses on the other two cases.
Part II: If more than one industry chooses to observe its industry-speci¯c productivity, but
industry i and industry j both choose not to, then corr(ni;nj) = 1 i® ¯i = ¯j.
Let ^ ¹ z be the posterior belief about aggregate technology, derived from the public signals. Equa-




¯i^ ¹ z=Vi +
X
l2In
(zl + ´l)=Vl] + ¹z
where K1 is a known constant, as are the posterior variances Vi and Vl, Un represents the set of
¯rms who are uninformed and In is the set of informed ¯rms. The two sum terms can be rewritten
33as K2^ ¹ z+ez, where K2 = 1=K1(
P
i ¯i=Vi) and ez = 1=K1
P
l2In(zl+´l¡^ ¹ z)=Vl, which is independent
of ^ ¹ z.
Substituting the posterior and the wage into equation (3) tells us that labor inputs in an
uninformed sector i are
ni = 1=(½Vi)((¯i ¡ K2)^ ¹ z + ez + ¹z)
as long as the non-negativity constraints on ni don't bind. The labor input of sector j is de¯ned
analogously.
Labor covariance is
cov(ni;nj) = (¯i ¡ K2)(¯j ¡ K2)V ar(^ ¹ z) + V ar(ez):
The product of standard deviations of labor input is
std(ni)std(nj) = ((¯i ¡ K2)V ar(^ ¹ z) + V ar(ez))1=2((¯j ¡ K2)V ar(^ ¹ z) + V ar(ez))1=2:
The necessary condition for a correlation of 1 is that cov(ni;nj) = std(ni)std(nj). This is the case,
if an only if ¯i = ¯j. 2
B Data Description
Figure 9 highlights the basic facts, showing the low comovement of business-cycle variation in
value-added across industries (top panel). The bottom panel shows business cycle variation in these
detrended total factor productivity series. While there is clearly some comovement in productivity,
these data are quite clearly less correlated across sectors than outputs.
Table 1 provides greater detail about the cyclical behavior of these industries. Column one
shows the correlation of sectoral value-added with aggregate value-added, while column two shows
the correlation of sectoral input use with aggregate input use.
34Industry Correlation of industry data with aggregates.
Value-added Index of inputs TFP
Construction 0.70 0.79 0.72
Food 0.47 0.09 0.29
Tobacco 0.30 -0.12 -0.02
Textiles 0.18 0.68 -0.20
Apparel 0.52 0.40 0.08
Lumber -0.02 0.76 0.40
Furniture 0.86 0.84 0.12
Paper 0.60 0.70 0.27
Printing 0.68 0.61 0.30
Chemicals 0.73 0.55 0.52
Petroleum 0.34 0.30 0.29
Rubber 0.67 0.83 -0.08
Leather -0.37 0.53 -0.31
Stone 0.90 0.85 0.28
Primary metal 0.83 0.81 0.34
Fab. metal 0.87 0.86 0.37
Machinery 0.74 0.82 0.35
Electrical machinery 0.86 0.80 0.15
Autos 0.72 0.56 -0.06
Transport equip 0.25 0.35 0.26
Instruments 0.78 0.65 0.08
Misc. Manufacturing 0.39 0.56 0.14
Transportation 0.75 0.91 0.18
Communications 0.17 0.37 -0.10
Elec. Utilities 0.32 0.29 -0.17
Gas Utilities -0.01 0.17 -0.35
Trade 0.68 0.84 0.61
FIRE 0.30 0.12 0.33
Services 0.58 0.61 0.16
Simple average 0.51 0.57 0.17
Share-weighted average 0.58 0.61 0.32
Table 1: Coherence of Output, Inputs and TFP across industries.
Each cell shows the correlation of industry output, inputs or TFP with the corresponding aggregate.
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Figure 9: Comovement of output across industries and lesser comovement of total factor produc-
tivity across industries.
Analyzing Basu et al. (2006)'s \puri¯ed" measures of technology by industry.
36Figure 10: Descriptive statistics for industry TFP 1-factor model.
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